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Abstract
After World War II, every country that had been touched by or involved in the war had to
come to terms with its past. In the case of Switzerland, the Swiss government, the army and
some of the country’s leadership established a strong official historical memory of the war,
portraying Switzerland as a neutral, benevolent and well-fortified country that remained
innocent and untouched by the war.
From the 1960s onwards, Swiss artists and intellectuals challenged these myths by
presenting alternative views of the Swiss past in their work. Beginning in the 1970s, Swiss
historians published an increasing amount of scholarly research concerning Switzerland’s
World War II past, and challenging the official historical memory promoted by the
government.
In the 1990s, after the discovery of thousands of dormant Swiss bank accounts containing
Holocaust assets, Switzerland was forced to adopt a more realistic memory of its involvement
in World War II. An Independent Commission of Experts, established by the Swiss
government, conducted thorough research about Switzerland’s wartime involvement and
published its Final Report in 2002.

Keywords: Switzerland, collective memory, World War II, national myths.
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1. Introduction
Over the years after World War II almost every country involved or touched by the war had
its own way of dealing with the past. Some nations, like Germany, could not deny the
immense guilt and responsibility that weighed heavily on the German people. Germany
would spend decades dealing with the deeds committed by National Socialists and seeking
reconciliation with their victims. Germany’s World War II history was an “unmasterable
past.”1 The effects of the dismemberment of Germany—as a consequence of Germany's war
guilt—are still noticeable today, 20 years after the reunification. For many other countries,
however, the lines between being guilty and being a victim were not clear cut. Austria, for
example, held on for two generations to the myth constructed after the war of having been
„Hitler’s first victim“ Only in the early 1990s did the Austrian government officially admit to
their share of responsibility for Nazi war crimes committed during WWII.2
Due to growing international pressure in the 1990s, Switzerland also, a small country
in the heart of Europe, had to go through a historical paradigm shift. For years Switzerland
had been depicting itself as a completely neutral country, not involved in the war, surviving
the cauldron of war raging around its borders without being invaded. The Swiss had
convinced themselves that it was the strength of their unity and will (Willensnation) and the
force of their army that repelled potential invaders. The lead article by Pierre Béguin, chief
editor of the Gazette de Lausanne on 9 January 1946, expresses this sentiment accurately:
Ce qu’il y a surtout de réconfortant en tout cela, c’est que les réflexes nationaux
de notre people tout entier ont admirablent joué. […] Les Suisses étaient trop
sains d’esprit et trop attachés aux valeurs sur lesquelles ils ont édifié leur
1

Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); see also Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two
Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
2
Gunter Bischof, “Victims? Perpetrators? “Punching Bags” of European Historical Memory? The Austrians and
Their World War II Legacies,” German Studies Review, no. 27 (2004), 17-32.
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communauté nationale pour se laisser impressionner ou se laisser séduire. A
quelques exceptions près – qui concernent des trublions et des dévoyés – ils n’ont
pas chancelé. […] Et c’est ainsi que cette page de notre histoire qui aurait pu
être la plus sombre a été en vérité l’une des plus claires. Il en ira ainsi à l’avenir
également, face à d’autres dangers, si nous restons fidèles à nous-mêmes, si nos
reflexes nationaux jouent avec la même perfection.3
According to Béguin, Switzerland’s sound national reflexes, her sanity and her attachment to
values protected the country from invasion and helped her survive – what Hobsbawm calls
the “era of catastrophes” (Zeitalter der Katastrophe)4 – surprisingly well. Switzerland
appeared to have been spared from the turmoil and atrocities of World War II. The hardy
Swiss people seemed to have emerged stronger than ever after a war in a European world
ruined and tattered by the war. This perspective stood in the long tradition of Swiss
historiography depicting Switzerland as an exceptional nation and a special case (Sonderfall).
In this view Switzerland was different due to its political culture of direct democracy,
federalism, tradition of neutrality, and its multi-ethnic composition and multilingual culture.5
These national traits made Switzerland different from any other country of the world. The
country’s position as a peaceful and self-contained island in the middle of war-tormented
Europe seemed to enforce this view even further.
In the past few years, however, the question of Switzerland’s role and involvement in
World War II suddenly became a focus of national and international attention and criticism.
Thousands of dormant bank accounts of holocaust victims raised the question whether
Switzerland’s idealized self-image was merely a cover-up for a more shady and sordid past. It
precipitated a national identity crisis in a country with a strong sense of itself; the concept of
the Sonderfall Switzerland seemed exposed as a myth. In the course of this serious crisis, the

3

Pierre Béguin, Gazette de Lausanne, January 9, 1946:
http://www.letempsarchives.ch/Default/Skins/LeTempsFr/Client.asp?Skin=LeTempsFr&enter=true&AW=1318
877999656&AppName=2 (accessed October 23, 2011).
4
Eric Hobsbawm, Zeitalter der Extreme in Markus Furrer, Die Nation im Schulbuch (Hannover: Verlag
Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2004), 234.
5
See Paul Widmer, Die Schweiz als Sonderfall
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Swiss government ordered in 1996 the creation of an International Commission of Experts
(ICE), headed by the noted Swiss historian Jean-Francois Bergier (“Bergier Commission”).
For the first time the relationship between Switzerland and Nazi Germany before, during, and
after World War II was critically and independently researched and evaluated by expert
historians. The commission’s report published in 2002 painted a rather different picture of
Switzerland’s involvement in World War II than had been portrayed in the decades following
the war. Switzerland had compromised its neutral position during the war by secretly
cooperating with the Nazis especially in the economic arena and by closing its doors to
refugees from Nazi Germany. The deconstruction of national myths dear to the Swiss people
was a very painful.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to establish what exactly the Swiss did or did not do
during World War II. Rather I want to analyse how the war has been remembered in
Switzerland. The study of memory is not about whether the country’s behaviour during the
war was complicit, or pragmatic and understandable, but rather to comprehend the dialectic
between remembering and forgetting, emphasizing and concealing certain historical events. I
am also interested in the players, mechanisms and implications involved in the process of
constructing a national memory.6 It is vital to understand the difference between actual
historical facts and how nations remember them, acknowledging the historical truth
irrevocably connecting memory and historical facts. In the eyes of later generations, past
events happened the way they have been remembered and told in the national historical
narrative.
The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyze how the collective Swiss national
memory of World War II was constructed, maintained and modified by a handful of national
leaders in the decades following World War II. I will establish an outline of Switzerland’s
6

David Cesarani, foreword to Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2000), ix.
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involvement, position and role during World War and how they were remembered after 1945,
the players who were in the forefront of shaping the Swiss collective memory of the war, and
the consequences the different ways of remembering ultimately had on Switzerland. I will
conclude that, for the most part, the Swiss collective memory of World War II was shaped by
pragmatic leaders due to political necessity dictating these historical constructions.
Contemporary politics at any given time instrumentalized these myths. I will also highlight
how public officials, historians and the media fit the trajectory of World War II into a long
tradition of Swiss history built on a few key myths of national identity. It was this official
pragmatism that militated against a balanced Swiss historical narrative of its World War II
involvement and interaction with the outside world. Swiss historical consciousness has been
based on the myth of keeping a distance to the outside world:
Bremsend [gegen eine Öffnung der Schweiz] wirkt dabei oft der während
Jahrzehnten gehegte Mythos des “Abseitsstehens” mit der Überzeugung, dass
man besser fährt, wenn man sich aus allem heraushält. Da genügt auch nicht die
Erkenntnis der Historikerinnen und Historiker, dass die historische Wahrheit
anders aussieht. Zu stark sind solche Vorstellungen mit der nationalen Identität
verknüpft und Teil eines Geschichtsbewusstseins.7
I will conclude my thesis with a brief discussion about the reasons why it is important to
study the history of memory, particularly in the case of Switzerland.

2. Theories of Historical Memory
2.1. Maurice Halbwachs
The beginning of the concept of collective memory lies with the French philosopher and
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. In his book On Collective Memory he defines collective
7

Furrer, 11.
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memory as a flexible, constantly changing and socially constructed idea. Although
remembering is still an individual act, it is influenced by the collective of a group or society
as a whole and individual people are drawing on society to remember:
Yet it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in
society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories. […] It is in this
sense that there exists a collective memory and social framework for memory; it
is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and
participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.8
Collective memory, according to Halbwachs, is as impermanent and changing as society. As
an example he mentions how the constructed image and memory that the medieval pilgrims
had of Jerusalem was entirely different from the image other pilgrims cultivated at another
time in history. Yet these differences in collective memory are not random, but directly
influenced by the current situation the memory is constructed in:
For Halbwachs, the past is a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by
the concerns of the present. He argues that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of
the present shape the various views of the past as they are manifested respectively
in every historical epoch.9
How the memory of the past is directly influenced by the needs of the present can also
be observed in Switzerland’s history: In the summer of 1940, almost a year after the invasion
of Poland through the German and Soviet armies, things did not look good for Switzerland –
located in the heart of Europe between neighboring Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, France
and Italy. Within two months (April and May 1940), the Axis powers invaded Denmark,
Norway, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Swiss people became
more and more convinced that they might be next and suffer a similar fate before too long. In
this environment, General Henry Guisan, commander-in-chief of the Swiss army during
World War II delivered a speech at the strategically chosen location of the Rütli. In this
legendary meadow in the center of Switzerland the first three Swiss cantons purportedly
8
9

Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38.
Lewis A. Coser, introduction to On Collective Memory, by Maurice Halbwachs, 25.
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signed a document of mutual assistance in 1291. This event is remembered as standing at the
beginning of Switzerland as a nation. Guisan’s speech, not only because of his eloquence, but
also because of the choice of the historical location, was a strong indication of Swiss
resistance to potential Nazi depredations and has been remembered as such ever since. What
the Swiss needed at this point in time, was to be encouraged and assured that they would
survive this menacing international situation. So General Guisan was a “true master of
historical ceremony who in the most desperate situations evoked the past as a compelling
metaphor for contemporary events.”10 He used the founding myth of the Swiss nation as
historical ‘proof’ that it was possible to withstand overwhelming enemies and thus retain
freedom and independence.
According to Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory, the same story about the
foundation of Switzerland could, at a different time and under different circumstances, be
used to ‘remember’ a completely different aspect of Swiss history. Therefore, a study on the
Swiss memory of World War II during the post-war period is as much a study on the history
of the post-war period itself as it is a study of the historical events of the World War II:
Hier wird klar, dass Erinnern kein Zustand ist, sondern Bewegung und mit
Geschichte ebenso viel zu tun hat wie mit Gegenwart. Erinnerungen werden
gemacht und zwar im Moment des Erzählens und aus ihm heraus.11

2.2. Pierre Nora
Pierre Nora, a French historian whose work on memory and identity is considered
fundamental in France, compares and contrasts the notion of collective memory with the
concept of history:

10

Regula Ludi, “What Is So Special about Switzerland?,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ed.
Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudia Fogu (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 211.
11
Daniel de Falco, Der kleine Bund, 15. Februar 2003. http://www.archimob.ch/arc/livre/index_ger.php
(accessed October 18, 2011).
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Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting,
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived.
History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and
incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a
bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.12
In his description of memory Nora makes reference to Halbwachs’ theory that collective
memory is shaped by the concerns of the present. While history tries to rationally reconstruct
what happened in the past, memory is an organic process that, according to Nora, happens in
the present by way of the so-called lieux de mémoire. These “places of remembrance” can be
physical locations, such as a museums or sculptures, or events, abstract ideas, or institutions.
In the case of Switzerland, important lieux de mémoire are what Markus Furrer calls Swiss
historical “myths,” around which the Swiss construct their national identity.13 They are places
or concepts explicitly dedicated to the memory of a certain event, and therefore the product of
a lack of spontaneous memory, according to Nora:
Lieu de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory,
that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize
celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no
longer occur naturally.14
An example for this theory would be the recent oral history project “Archimob” in
Switzerland, conducted under the title L’histoire, c’est moi: 555 Versionen der Schweizer
Geschichte 1939-1945. The project collected 555 interviews with people who had
experienced World War II in Switzerland and asked them about their “personal, special and
ordinary experiences in the time between 1939 and 1945.”15

12

Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, Representations, no. 26 (1989),
http://www.sfu.ca/media-lab/archive/2007/487/Resources/Readings/Nora_between%20memory.pdf (accessed
October 23, 2011).
13
See Markus Furrer, Die Nation im Schulbuch.
14
Nora, Between Memory and History.
15
Archimob. http://www.archimob.ch/d/ausstellung.html (accessed October 16, 2011).
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Interpreted according to Nora, this brilliant project only happened because there is no
room anymore for the production of spontaneous memory in Swiss society, and an official
archive has to be set up to conserve these individual testimonies. The multitude of lieux de
mémoire in Switzerland – actual places like the Rütli as well as abstract concepts like Swiss
neutrality – leads us therefore to the conclusion that the formation of a completely free and
spontaneous individual memory culture did not happen in Switzerland.
It seems like Switzerland’s handling of World War II would be an example of what
Nora calls the acceleration of history, which he describes as “an increasingly rapid slippage
of the present into a historical past that is gone for good,”16 which leaves neither time nor
space for the remembrance of an event. However, considering Nora’s definition of history as
an intellectual construct and reconstruction of the past, we come to the conclusion that it is –
not possible to talk about an acceleration of history in the case of Switzerland’s dealing with
World War II. In fact, what happened is the institutional construction of an official memory
of World War II soon after the war, consciously highlighting aspects of the war that were in
line with the national self-image and omitting facts that were perceived as ill-suited for the
concerns of the post-war period. The Bonjour affair is an example for this (described in more
detail in chapter 4). As this institutionally constructed memory does neither fall into the
category of collective memory, nor of factual history, I am using the term “public memory”
where needed. “Public memory” is referring to the version of memory dominating in the
public, which can, but does not have to, be memory constructed institutionally in order to
serve political needs.17

16

Nora, Between Memory and History.
Luc van Dongen, “Swiss Memory of the Second World War in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-48,” in
Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 261.
17

13

2.3. Jan Assmann
Jan Assmann’s reflections on the different types of memory form an important addition to
studies of historical memory developed by Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. Assmann, a
German historian of ancient Egypt, makes the important distinction between what he calls
communicative memory and cultural memory, which differ in the first place in their distance
in time to the actual event. Communicative memory only stretches as far as we can find
contemporary witnesses to a certain event:
Its most important characteristic is its limited temporal horizon. As all oral
history studies suggest, this horizon does not extend more than eighty to (at the
very most) one hundred years into the past, which equals three or four
generations…18
Following this time span of up to one hundred years we find a different type of memory,
which Assmann calls cultural memory. Cultural memory is not only different in its distance
to the event and the fact that it does not change with time, but also in its function. Assmann
isolated six main characteristics of which I am going to choose the three most relevant to the
analysis of Swiss memory of World War II.
First, there is the concretion of identity through cultural memory, which “preserves
the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and
peculiarity.”19 He points out that such a concretion of memory creates a sharp distinction
between the “us” and the “them.” In the case of Switzerland such a concretion of identity
through cultural memory can be seen in the context of Switzerland’s self-image as a small yet
powerful state. This essential aspect of Swiss identity is upheld and perpetuated through the
cultivation of the memory of important events in Swiss history that exemplify and therefore
preserve the notion of being a “mighty dwarf.” Examples for this would be the
18

Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, no. 65 (1995),
http://www.let.uu.nl/~Elena.Carrillo/personal/LITERATURA%20Y%20GUERRA%20CIVIL/ARTICULOS/As
smann.pdf (accessed October 23, 2011).
19
Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.
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commemoration of the “Rütlischwur”, a declaration of mutual assistance and independence of
the three first Swiss cantons as “ein einzig Volk von Brüdern,” as Schiller expressed it, every
year on August 1. Another example would be the remembrance of the “Schlacht von
Sempach” (battle of Sempach) in 1386, which is regarded as the highlight of the separation of
the Swiss from the Habsburgs. The undersized peasant army of the Swiss Confederation
emerged victorious in this crucial battle and turning point in Swiss history. In the aftermath of
World War II, the memory of Sempach was used again to substantiate the idea of Swiss
independence and military victory achieved again against overwhelming odds.
A second characteristic of cultural memory, according to Assmann, is its capacity to
reconstruct. This aspect is very closely linked to Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of the past as a
construct according to the needs of the present. Assmann differentiates between two possible
existences of cultural memory: first in the form of accumulated sources and pieces of
memory like texts and images “act[ing] as a total horizon” and comprehending all potential
interpretation of this material; and second in the form of a form of individual memory -- an
“actuality, whereby each contemporary puts the objectivized meaning into its own
perspective, giving it its own relevance.”20
A third characteristic mentioned by Assmann – organization – lies in the realm of
language. Cultural memory brings about a certain institutionalization of communication: it
not only reduces the communicative situation – to a degree – to a formula, but also is
specialized in the “bearers of cultural memory.”21 This essentially describes the influence of
culture on the language, which results in a canonized and specified use of the language,
shaped through a society’s cultural memory.

20
21

Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.
Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.
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2.4. Theory of Memory Regarding Switzerland
What, then, are the concepts that can be applied from these theories of historical memory to
the case study of Switzerland’s memory of World War II? Most useful for the Swiss case
study is Maurice Halbwachs’ theory that collective memory is a flexible construct, shaped by
the concerns of the present. It implies that memory can also be understood as a political tool,
if used consciously. Pierre Nora’s theory on the lieux de mémoire is also useful, especially in
the context of what Markus Furrer calls national myths, which can be understood as abstract
lieux de mémoire. Also, Nora’s notion of the acceleration of history will be an important part
of the analysis of the collective memory constructed during the immediate post-war area.
Finally, Jan Assmann’s cultural memory with its characteristics, especially his thoughts on
the function of collective memory in relation to the concretion of identity, will play an
important role in the analysis of the development of Swiss collective memory of World War
II.

3. The Immediate Post-war Period: Collective
Memory Construction
3.1. The Geistige Landesverteidigung and its Consequences
Already before World War II was unleashed in Europe in 1939, Switzerland felt an urgent
need to protect its identity, its national interests and its sovereignty against the rising tide of
National Socialism in Germany. Adolf Hitler had seized dictatorial powers in the spring of
1933. He consolidated his power not only through equalizing (Gleichschaltung) all relevant
political, social and cultural aspects of German culture, but also through the elimination of
potential political opponents, Hitler justified the suppression of the opposition as necessary to

16
protect the country. Understandably, Switzerland felt under siege and threatened both on a
political level and a cultural one. In response to the specter of Nazi invasion, Swiss elites
initiated a movement that became known as “geistige Landesverteidigung” (spiritual national
defense). Its purpose was the protection of Switzerland through the strengthening of its
unique national identity:
The Geistige Landesverteidigung aimed to emphasize Swiss individuality and
thereby strengthen the desire for political independence and military national
defense. It thereby fulfilled a desire (and the necessity) to demarcate itself from
the outside world, in particular from the Third Reich, and also promoted internal
social stability.22
Although not a new concept, the geistige Landesverteidigung was a direct reaction to the dire
threat from the Third Reich, promoted by the country’s elites. The Landesverteidigung’s
power and profound influence impacted the Swiss national character and lasted for much
longer than the interwar period and World War II, as Joseph Mooser has explained:
This key phrase is associated with the experience and memory of the
country’s critical situation in the period between the two world wars and, in
particular, the collective experience of standing up to National Socialist German,
which since 1933 had been perceived by a great majority of the population as a
threat to their very existence. Thus the values, attitudes, and objectives of the
Swiss self-image in the context of the ‘spiritual national defense’ […] exerted an
influence that lasted until well after the Second World War.23
The need for internal unity and the strengthening of the Swiss self-image were driving
forces of the movement of the Geistige Landesverteidigung and triggered additional cultural
as well as political measures. From a cultural aspect, the Swiss National Exhibition of 1939
under the title “Landigeist” (spirit of the home country) is a telling example of the national
cultural atmosphere at this time. Politically, the Bundesversammlung (Federal Convention) of
Switzerland is made up by the Nationalrat (National Assembly) and the Ständerat (Council

22

Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland, National Socialism and
the Second World War (Zürich: Pendo Verlag, 2002), 74 [hereinafter cited as ICE]..
23
Joseph Mooser, “Spiritual National Defense,” in Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 236-237.
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of States). The Bundesversammlung granted the Bundesrat (National Council) in August
1939 – as part of the Geistige Landesverteidigung -- and in order to allow the Swiss
government to react quickly and effectively to the developments of the war – full emergency
powers and authorized it to enact laws without a statutory basis. On the grounds of protecting
the country, the Bundesrat made use of these powers. During the war it heavily censored the
press, radio, film, photography and books; it also put various restrictions on the public
discourses of the nation’s newspapers.
The Swiss nation experienced exhilarating relief when the war had come to an end in
Europe in May 1945. The axis powers had collapsed and Switzerland had survived this “age
of catastrophe” (Hobsbawm). Switzerland did not get swallowed up by the gigantic clash of
world powers. Yet the challenge for a small nation to survive in the midst of a new conflict
emerging between the former allies in East and West posed new threats and challenges.
Before World War II Swiss neutrality was regarded as a virtue. During and after the war,
however, it aroused suspicions not only from the hostile axis powers (Hitler referred to
Switzerland as “a pimple on the face of Europe”24), but also amongst the friendly allies. As
early as in 1942, a British journalist described Switzerland as the place “where the big shot
Nazis have parked their loot.”25 This raised the issue of secret Swiss collaboration with
Hitler’s Germany. The possibility, then, of being implicated with being an accessory in the
Nazi war of aggression and extermination emerged as a new threat by the end of the war. It is
therefore not entirely surprising that the Swiss Bundesrat thought it unwise to abandon the
powers granted by the Nationalversammlung during the war.
In the shifting international environment and with the looming threat of wartime
collaboration with the Nazis being exposed, Switzerland still needed to look out for its
interests after the war. It was this pragmatic mindset that heavily influenced the formation of
24
25

Martin Bormann et al., Hitler's Table Talk: 1941-1944 (London: Enigma Books, 2000), 800.
ICE, 23.
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the Swiss collective memory of World War II in the following years. 26 Since the future
international standing of the country depended heavily on how its role during World War II
was perceived by the victorious Allies, the politics of history in the construction of an
acceptable historical memory of the war became

a prime national concern. Geistige

Landesverteidigung not only allowed a more authoritative government coming out of the war
to influence the collective memory. It also resulted in what Mooser calls an “identity
construct.”27 Both these developments significantly shaped the way the Second World War
was remembered by the Swiss.

3.2. Mythmaking à la Suisse: The Construction of the Official Post-war
Collective Memory
The construction of Swiss official historical memory of World War II began
immediately after the end of the war in the tradition of the Geistige Landesverteidigung
exercised before and during World War II. It was a defensive act against external pressure
and it aimed at protecting national unity, identity, and self-image. There was an immediate
need to include the events of the war as a coherent part of Swiss identity in a pragmatically
refurbished national historical narrative. At the center of this construction were both the
reinforcement of old and the establishment of new national historical myths, above all the
myth of the Réduit Alpine (the successful retreat into the core fortress of the Swiss defense
system in case of an attack), and the myth of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan during
World War II, welcoming refugees from Nazi Germany. The “concretion” (Assmann) of
these myths was so powerful and profound that it took journalists, artists, historians and –
eventually – the Swiss government decades to demystify and deconstruct the trajectory of
World War II to make a way for a more rational and factual examination of Switzerland’s
26
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role during the war. In the late 1940s the international political arena was still so acutely
unstable in the eyes of the country’s leadership that close Swiss cooperation with both Nazis
and allies needed to be silenced in order to maintain the myth of strict Swiss neutrality during
the war. The country needed its rootedness in its identity of neutrality and unity of purpose.
Thus the myths of relentless military defense of Swiss independence and acting as a safe
haven for refugees from Nazi Germany were a vital part of this process of stabilization. This
stabilization effort is reflected by the important role the government and the army assumed as
the designers and guardians of the collective memory of World War II. Swiss statesmen such
as Max Petitpierre and military leaders such as General Guisan assumed the role of principal
mythmakers.

3.2.1. National Myths and the Creation of Official Lieux de Mémoire
The construction and conservation of historical myths has been an important part in
Swiss statesmanship and historiography. According to Markus Furrer, myths are an important
part of Switzerland’s representation of the past since Switzerland’s identity is in the first
place a historic construction. The national identity of the multi-ethnic country Switzerland is
not based on ethnic principles like in the case of Germany, or cultural traits like in the case of
France.28 Therefore, historical myths have been vital in the creation of a coherent Swiss
nation; they have played an important part in establishing a Swiss national identity, and have
provided the Swiss national historical narrative with continuity from the Middle Ages to the
20th century.29 With these historical myths playing such an important role in defining Swiss
national identity, it was important to align the events of the Second World War with this
carefully constructed Swiss historical narrative.
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Among the most dominant myths in the post-World-War-II era of Switzerland role
during World War II were the myths of Swiss neutrality during the war, the Réduit Alpine,
and Switzerland as the Good Samaritan.30 These myths were used as powerful guideposts
around which the collective memory of the war in post-war Switzerland was organized.
Events that fit the mythical self-image were emphasized, reinforced and often embellished.
Historical facts such as Switzerland rejection of some 20,000 refugees denied entry at the
borders (“Das Boot ist voll”), both Swiss cooperation with Nazi Germany (in the economic
arena) and the Allies (allowing intelligence operatives and activities on its soil), which did
not fit the official concept of the pursuit of strict neutrality during the war, were temporarily
forgotten and silenced in the historical narrative and only came to light decades after World
War II.31 The establishment and cultivation of these historical myths is particularly evident
when examining the way Swiss history books presented the events of World War II in the
post-war period.
Switzerland’s strict wartime neutrality was a powerful, yet dangerous myth in postwar Switzerland. Powerful, since it became an important and lasting lieu de mémoire for
Switzerland and part of the Swiss self-image, but also dangerous in the sense that it formed a
smokescreen for secret activities during World War II that were not intended to be made
public to the Swiss people. Swiss collaboration with Axis and Allied powers needed to be
suppressed or communicated carefully. After all, Switzerland was not invaded but rather
dealt with those powers discreetly behind the scenes. Switzerland refused to join the
collective security arrangements of the United Nations in 1945/46, again hiding behind the
smokescreen of strict neutrality. Therefore, Swiss Bundesrat Max Petitpierre, Switzerland’s
iconic foreign minister between 1945 and 1961 and former law professor at the university of
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Neuenburg, added the concept of international solidarity to Switzerland’s neutrality policy.32
“Neutrality and Solidarity” was the heading under which the Swiss role in World War II was
to be remembered, a concept that was supposed to describe the past as well as serve the
present and the future. By adding the concept of solidarity to Switzerland’s neutrality,
Switzerland positioned itself on the “good” side of the war while still adhering to its
neutrality, but not just merely sitting on the fence, but actively supporting the victims of the
conflict. Markus Furrer explained how Switzerland was viewed to have been saved during the
war by its putative policy of strict neutrality and fierce national independence as well as its
role as the Good Samaritan:
Die mythologisierte Darstellung von Neutralität verknüpft Unabhängigkeit und
Neutralität aufs Engste, sie erkennt in der Neutralität die Ursache für das
Verschontbleiben der Schweiz vor den Katastrophen des kurzen 20. Jahrhunderts
und verknüpft damit den Wohltätigkeitsgedanken einer helfenden Schweiz.33
Just how far the Swiss government was willing to go to protect this myth of strict
neutrality becomes clear in the controversy about the publication of the important multivolume collection of captured German documents in Documents on German Foreign Policy
by the American government. The Swiss government worked tirelessly for almost a decade to
stop the publication of documents that revealed evidence of a secret Franco-Swiss military
cooperation during the war, which would have undermined its concept of strict neutrality.
Although the documents were published in 1961, the government succeeded in averting a
crisis with these historical revelations. It successfully ‘distracted’ the Swiss people by
focussing on a document that described Corps Commander Ulrich Wille’s contact with the
German ambassador in Switzerland.
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sympathetic attitude towards the Germans and the publication of the Documents on German
Foreign Policy took a back seat.
As a last resort, therefore, and in the nick of time, Wille became the sacrifice that
would prevent the feared questioning of neutrality as a result of the uproar over
another scandal. But the foundations of the neutrality myth were shaken anyway,
although the ‘affair of the deputy’ successfully prevented the full dimensions of
this becoming apparent to the Swiss public.34
Looking at how the Swiss neutrality myth was portrayed in Swiss history books in the postwar period further illustrates the mythical character of the neutrality concept. Markus Furrer’s
detailed analysis is invaluable for this task. His research demonstrates how, up until the late
1980s, the concept of Swiss neutrality was mostly offered as a plausible description of and
key element in Switzerland’s historical narrative in Swiss schoolbooks, and how a few
textbooks even presented the myth as a seemingly unquestionable historical fact (e.g. a
textbook by Eugen Halter from 1960/61).35
The myth of the Réduit Alpine/National combines a conceptual lieu de mémoire,
remembering the military threat and the steadfastness of the Swiss people and the army, with
an actual, geographical one: the Alps. The Alps form the heart of the Réduit national, which
can be translated as National Retreat/Space, and serve as a symbol for Switzerland’s military
resistance against Nazi Germany throughout the war. In dozens of post-war Swiss history text
books, the myth of the Réduit national dominates the chapter on World War II in
Switzerland. The military aspects and the threat against the Swiss people are at the center of
attention. It seems like it was only due to brave General Guisan and the courage and
willingness of the Swiss army to resist a potential Nazi invasion that Switzerland was not
overrun by the Axis powers. The containment of the Nazi threat succeeded due to the
deterrent effect of the sturdy Swiss army. The following excerpt of a history book from 1975
34
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illustrates the fearsome nature of the Swiss Alpine fortress, where every nook and cranny
became a gun emplacement, clearly:
Im Herzen der Schweiz, wo ihre Freiheit gegründet worden war, sollte sie im
Falle eine[s] Angriffs verteidigt werden. Das ganze Bergland wurde zu einer
mächtigen Festung ausgebaut. Aus unzulänglichen Felsennestern richteten
Geschütze ihre Mündungen nach allen Tälern.36
Especially in the light of the new nuclear threats of the Cold War, the myth of the
Réduit National served the important purpose of strengthening Swiss national morale. It built
confidence to defy any enemy through their power of will and readiness to die for their
country once again. The fact that Switzerland in fact was not invaded during the war and the
perception of General Guisan as the key figure in protecting and leading the defence of
Switzerland, put him and the army in a powerful position to shape and define the memory of
World War II. This is illustrated by the largely militarized memory of World War II as
portrayed in Furrer’s analysis of Swiss history books after the war. It was not until the 1990s
that most textbooks presented the myth of the Réduit Alpine as an actual myth and not as a
historical fact. However, in a long special historical edition, published in 1990 with the title
“Switzerland and the Second World War,” 21 of a total of 80 pages were dedicated to the
military readiness of the country.37
The third national myth established as a pillar of the collective memory of World War
II in Switzerland was the fiction of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan. Initiated by Max
Petitpierre’s addition of the concept of solidarity as a constituent element of strict Swiss
neutrality, it remembered Switzerland as the originator of the international Red Cross and as
a humanitarian and benevolent country. During the World War II the notion of the Good
Samaritan Switzerland was illustrated perfectly by its supposedly having voluntarily opened
its doors to political and racial refugees, having acted through the Red Cross as the main third
36
37

Furrer, 261.
Furrer, 263.

24
party protector of prisoners of war, and having made an effort to “assuage the evils of the
war.”38
A demonstration of the importance of this memory is the result of the so-called
“White Paper affair” in Switzerland in 1946 (see 3.2.2). Originally intended as a report on the
government’s activities during the war, the project was transformed into “a collection of
essays on Switzerland’s humanitarian activities during the war. […] This transformation,
then, is clearly illustrative of a policy which Peter Hug has described as compensation for
‘Switzerland’s failure to participate in the construction of post-war peace by means of
nationally exaggerated humanitarian activities’.”39
Once it became known, that Switzerland had marked the passport of German and
Austrian Jews with a “J”-stamp, the Swiss government commissioned Dr. Carl Ludwig, a law
professor from Basle and a former government councilor with the production on a report on
Swiss refugee policy. Now known as the Ludwig Report, it came out in 1957 and its author
did not mince words:
Ludwig was determined to expose the restrictive attitude of the authorities
unsparingly; he deplored the fact that refugee policy was largely determined by
the aliens section of the police … he also referred to the restrictive requirements
of the army and the ‘not very creditable attitude’ of certain cantons. He had no
time for the excuse that people had too little knowledge of what was going on
over there in the Reich’.40
The Swiss government employed various strategies to justify its refugee policy and did not
shy away from using an individual as a scapegoat in order to protect its image. In an
important section on the introduction of the “J”-stamp, the report stated that, according to Dr.
Oprecht, a national councilor, Dr. Rothmund, the Chief of Police during World War II had
initiated the use of the “J”-stamp in 1938 and was therefore to be solely responsible for its
38
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consequences. In fact, however, the Swiss Federal Council had made all the significant
decisions in relation to the introduction of the “J”-stamp itself, as it admitted many years
later.,41
Although the 1957 Ludwig report contained some harsh criticism of the way the
refugee policy had been handled during the war, it did not trigger a memory debate or any
self-criticism.42 The press played a considerable role in maintaining the myth of Switzerland
as a Good Samaritan: The liberal Neue Zürcher Zeitung for example, stated that “the lessons
lay not in the excessively restrictive attitude, but more in the fact, that the inherently correct
principle of ‘generous acceptance’ had to be kept within limits because of food problems and
security requirements.”43 Equally, the socialist newspaper Volksrecht warned against the
complacency of hindsight and pointed out that the “significantly more comfortable standpoint
of 1957”44 should not be abused to criticize decisions that were made under very difficult and
complex circumstances.
When looking at Swiss history books, it becomes evident that the country’s behaviour
as a merciful and generous benefactor to refugees was rarely questioned until the 1980s. Only
40 years after the war was it possible to question Switzerland’s “Good Samaritan” image
during World War II and the closing of its borders to floods of refugees from Hitler’s
Germany (“das Boot ist voll”).45

3.2.2. The Politics of History: The Role of the Swiss Government
The Swiss government ruled the country during the World War II with a considerable amount
of authoritative power that was democratically legitimated. By the end of the war the
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politicians had become used to the idea that, in order to protect the country and its population,
excessive authority had to be used and tough decisions had to be made. This mindset was also
applied to the way the Swiss remembered their own past:
Die Landesregierung verstand sich als Hüterin eines Geschichtsbildes, das nach
wie vor der Staatsraison zu dienen hatte. Dieser Zweck schien unzimperliche
Massnahmen zu rechtfertigen.46
Already during the first post-war month the concretion of historical memory of the war was
put in place. Halbwachs’ theory that the past is a construction based on the concerns of the
present was quickly becoming apparent when we look at the specific actions of the Swiss
government in defining the framework of an acceptable historical narrative of Swiss behavior
during the war. Understandably, its pragmatic principal concern was for Switzerland to
survive World War II with all its aftershocks and every decision was subordinated to this
national goal. In this framework, the memory of the war was a powerful tool that could be
used to fortify Swiss identity and its status in the world, but it also needed to be controlled.
This becomes clear when looking at an incident that happened in 1945 concerning the
documentary evidence to buttress the factual history of World War II. Two members of the
Nationalrat, Albert Maag and Urs Dietschi, requested that documentary evidence be made
available to back up the government’s official reports on anti-democratic activities during the
Second World War.47 From the very outset of constructing an official collective memory,
official reports and white papers were a popular form for the government to communicate the
official, yet seemingly objective, historical narrative of Swiss actions during World War II.
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The “controlled management of the past” was crucial to contain the “hidden dangers of
explosive revelation” that might have demystified the official narrative.48
The Swiss government commissioned the historian Werner Näf, a history professor at
the university of Bern, to file a report and to provide the Swiss government with options on
how to deal with Mag’s and Dietschi’s potentially explosive request. Näf presented the
government with three options to control access to the World War II past: “1. Publication of
the Swiss political documents, in other words a “White Paper”; 2. A documented account of
Swiss foreign policy during wartime by a historian commissioned by the Federal Council; 3.
A future free academic use of the material.”49 After careful deliberation, Näf proposed to
reject both the first and the third options. The publication of a White Paper, he argued, would
not be in line with the way the Swiss government had pursued its policy in the past;
publishing a purged record would give the impression that the Swiss had something to hide. 50
He rejected the third option for different reasons. If the material was made available
completely to the public and academic study raised issues of timing and academic integrity:
“’whether they would be dealt with in a true academic sense … would be a matter of chance
and hardly likely in the immediate future’, which would not be in line with the intended
purpose of an ‘early public elucidation of Swiss foreign policy’.”51 Based on this reasoning,
Näf recommended to the Swiss government to go with the second option and commission a
historian to write a well-documented account. The government then could control the
outcome by commissioning a carefully selected reliable historian. This line of argument was
classic politics of history – you control the outcome by narrowing access to the record to a
select historian who understands what is at stake for his nation’s reputation in the world.
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Näf’s argumentation, then, sheds light on the mindset of the Swiss leadership and
political elite in the immediate post-war period regarding the construction of the memory of
the war. It clearly demonstrates how eminently political the definition of wartime Swiss
memory was. First, Swiss historical memory had to be presented to the public in a form that
was acceptable for the government’s image at home and abroad. The government kept strict
control over the formation of the nation’s wartime memory. Enough information had to be
made available to remain credible but not too much to spill the beans on Swiss complicity.
Second, the government decided what could be publicized and what not – historians such as
Näf only played a subordinate role in this process. Third, memory must not be allowed to
form loosely and freely since it had to “enlighten” the Swiss population as to the
government’s benevolent role during the war and topresent the government in a favorable
light.
Regarding the theory of memory we can observe several aspects of Halbwachs’, Nora’s
and Assmann’s concepts in the way the Swiss government dealt with the past. First, the past
was already shaped by the immediate concerns of the present. Switzerland needed to be
protected from the weight of the complicit past and reassured about its future, and the
government’s politics of history on how to deal with the World War II trajectory of its history
reflected this urgent need. Secondly, we can observe what Nora called the “acceleration of
history” (as described in more detail in chapter 2.2) through the government. This speeding
up of the institutionalizing and fixation of historical memory, which then became history, was
at best an (incomplete) representation of the past. Third, we can see the memory already in its
actuality, as Assmann described it, and no longer in its organic bits and pieces, the usual
incoherent factual chaos that is the historical past. The government took on the task of
selecting the “official” and “relevant” pieces of information from the infinite pool of
historical matter and shaped it into a usable past on behalf of the entire population, never
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mind that individual memories often clashed with the official collective memory. This clash
too had to be silenced. The further development of Näf’s suggestion to commission a
historian to write a coherent master narrative of Switzerland’s role during the war further
supports this point. Ultimately the government implemented none of his three suggested
options (White Paper, documentation, academic analysis). Instead, the government pursued a
minimal version, to highlight Switzerland’s role as Good Samaritan and squeaky clean
neutral power
All that was now being attempted was a collection of essays on Switzerland’s
humanitarian activities during the war. This transformation of the White Paper is
all the more astonishing in that the original plan for a collection of documents had
in no way been conceived as a critical reworking of the past but, rather, as an
apologetic presentation of the way neutrality had been handled under Axis
pressure.52
The “critical reworking of the past” in order to master it, was not Switzerland’s highest
priority in the immediate post-war period. There were more critical demands of national and
international politics that were more pressing and needed to be addressed pragmatically. The
construction of a historical memory of the war served as a powerful tool in the government’s
hands to fashion a usable and masterable past. However, the government cannot take all the
credit for the success and acceptance of its official concretion of historical memory of World
War II:
Because of personal experience and the ‘conditioning’ of minds during the time
of conflict, the Swiss population shared a very positive image of the part their
country had played during the war. It was, therefore, entirely ready to accept the
reassuring image offered to it by its leaders.53
In other words, the Swiss people were complicit too in settling with the simplistic version of
a usable past: they heard what they wanted to hear. For the most part they eagerly embraced
the government’s official version of the historical memory of World War II.
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3.2.3. The Hedgehog: General Guisan and the Swiss Army
The Swiss government was undoubtedly the main player in the construction of an
acceptable collective and cultural memory of the war, albeit not the only one. In the
immediate post-war years in Switzerland, the army had a noteworthy influence on national
affairs in Switzerland. The Army chief spokesman was General Guisan who emerged as one
of Switzerland’s most respected leaders out of World War II. As the commander-in-chief of
the Swiss army, General Guisan’s opinion was highly respected and influential. He emerged
at the center in the creation of an idealized and heroic public version of Swiss historical
memory of World War II. The subsequent powerful “sanctification” of World War II memory
through his speeches and public statements created a certain sense of obligation to bring
personal individual memories in line with Guisan’s version of the collective memory. In his
view there was

only one way of remembering World War II and the accomplishments of

what he called “the generation of 1939 to 1945.” Switzerland’s survival through difficult
times deserved to be honored. The following statement in his order of the day for 8 May 1945
illustrates his version of a usable past, never mind that the Swiss army did not fire a single
shot in the war:
What is important, then, is that the benefit of this experience, this trial, should not
be wasted. If, in the near or more distant future, our army were to be called to
arms to defend our independence once again, the generation of 1939 to 1945 will
arise again, identify themselves and join the ranks. But those men will only be
worthy of their task if they do not reject it in any way either in their deeds or in
their thoughts, and if they pass on to those who follow their courage, their sense
of duty and their loyalty.54
This excerpt gives an impression of the mechanisms that were involved in the establishment
of a collective memory immediately after the war and the role the army’s leadership played in
it. First, it established the army as the main player in the defense of Switzerland’s
independence and therefore the savior of Switzerland. Second, it reinforced the thinking that
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there was only one “right” way to interpret and remember the war. Everybody who would
“reject their task in any way, either in their deeds or in their thoughts” would not be worthy
of fighting for Switzerland. Guisan almost demanded “blind” obedience to his narrative of the
war from the Swiss people. Merely questioning the official narrative was unworthy of a
Swiss citizen and smacked of a traitor. Guisan’s narrative created a version of official
historical memory that was, irreversibly set in stone only months after the end of the war (e.g.
Assmann’s “concretion” of memory).
Another core document that helped establish the trajectory of Swiss historical memory
of the war as one shaped by the military, was General Guisan’s report to the Bundesrat about
the army’s activities during the war. Ostensibly, it was a plain documentation of Swiss
military preparedness during the war. In fact, the report significantly shaped Swiss historical
memory of the war by initiating the public debate on the events between 1939 and 1945. As a
primarily military document, it has three main consequences:
First, it is a ‘memorial’ to the spirit of resistance in the Swiss people and their
army; second, it helps to ‘militarize’ the memory of the war; and third, it
strengthens the image of a hedgehog Switzerland, owing its fate to its courage
alone…55
In this initial post-war period, Switzerland’s memory of World War II became firmly fixed,
as Pierre Béguin has noted,56 and the themes and myths established during this time would
prove to be enduring. They dominated Swiss historical memory discourses for at least two
generations after the war. It was almost impossible to question this version of the usable past
set into stone by the wartime generation.
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4. The “Helvetic Malaise” with History
The mystified Swiss perception of its own history was so deeply rooted that not even major
events that triggered an international debate on memory and the war could affect it. In the
early 1960s, for example, the high profile Auschwitz and Eichmann trials could not shake
Switzerland’s view of its own past. Like in Austria, the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, although
well covered, sparked not enough interest to realistically challenge the cultivated memory
dogmas established immediately after the war.57 However, individual memories of the war
were not lost entirely. From the 1950s onwards, an increasing number of intellectuals,
writers, and artists found creative ways of dealing with their own view of the past and
challenging the Swiss government and its official memory policy. They were soon followed
by a growing number of historians, such as Georg Kreis or Marc Perrenoud, who gradually
“undermined the self-congratulatory myths about Switzerland’s conduct towards Nazi
Germany.”58 The Swiss government, however, seemed to by limping behind these
developments, and held onto the attempt to regulate and contain history by commissioning
official reports: In 1962 the Bundesrat instructed the historian Edgar Bonjour to write a report
on Switzerland’s foreign policy during World War II, a request entirely in the tradition of
Näf’s White Paper in 1945.

4.1.

The Establishment of a Beachhead: Artists and Intellectuals Begin to

Question Official Memory
In her essay “What is so special about Switzerland” Regula Ludi talks about an “engendered
uneasiness” among Swiss thinkers and creative minds, starting as early as the 1950s. In its
beginnings, however, these alternative views of the past were only expressed periodically and
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did not resonate with the Swiss public.59 It was only from the 1970s onwards, however, that
artists and intellectuals successfully managed to challenge the constructed memory of
Switzerland’s mythological World War II past. It took a new generation of historians and
intellectuals, often born after the war, to question the outdated official old verities and draw
up an emerging new version of Switzerland’s complex history during World War II.
An example for the expression of this growing “malaise”60 is the work of Swiss writer
Max Frisch. Born in Zurich in 1911 as the son of an architect, Frisch published countless
articles, essays and dozens of novels, and is widely regarded as one of the most influential
Swiss writers of the 20th century. In his novels as well as in his diaries and his work as a
publicist, he picked Switzerland and its past and identity as a central theme, and confronted
the official memory constructs.
Particularly relevant with regard to Switzerland’s historical memory of World War II is
his work Dienstbüchlein, published in 1974.61 It was effectively a revision of his personal
early wartime diary, Blätter aus dem Brotsack

62

that had been published in 1940/39. Frisch

not only reflected critically upon his personal perspective during World War II and the army
in general, but also expressed his consternation about Switzerland’s cooperation with Nazi
Germany. The reactions to Frisch’s Dienstbüchlein were controversial. Frisch was already an
established and respected author, so the fundamental question was whether his book had,
besides its literary value, also a historical significance. If the book proved to communicate
some historical truth, it would radically challenge the myth of Switzerland as a well-fortified
“hedgehog,” surviving the war because of its army and its neutrality. Although some critics,
such as noted historians Jean Rudolf von Salis or Hermann Burger conceded some historical
value to the book, others like Zurich linguist Ernst Leisi, interestingly accused Frisch of
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describing a myth, not history.63 Leisi tried to reinforce the well-established and comfortable
official version of the past that had been established immediately after the war.
One of the most significant artistic representations of Switzerland’s process of
beginning to come to terms with its past is the film Das Boot ist voll.64 The production by
Markus Imhoof is based on a book by novelist Alfred Häsler of the same title. The film was
screenend in 1981 and expressed the “malaise”65 with the current historical memory of World
War II by telling the fictional story of six people who sought refuge in Switzerland in 1942.
These were the Jewish siblings Judith and Olaf, Ostrowskij, an old Jewish man from Vienna
with his granddaughter, a French orphan and a German deserter. They were all seeking
asylum in the neutral country that had officially closed its borders to all “refugees who have
fled purely on racial grounds.”66 The film does not sugar-coat anything. In the end, Judith,
Olaf, Ostrowskij and his granddaughter – the refugees that had fled to Switzerland on racial
grounds – were escorted to the border by the authorities, where certain death awaited them in
the concentration camp of Treblinka.
In a dramatic way, the story shed light on a dark aspect of Switzerland’s past that had
been swept under the carpet for four decades and directly challenged the foundation myth of
Switzerland’s World War II role as the Good Samaritan. Predictably, the reactions to
Imhoof’s film project were mixed. Already before the actual production of the film, the Swiss
government criticized Imhoof. He had applied for a grant to cover parts of the production
costs of the project, but he was turned down by the Bundesrat with the argument that it was
antiquated in its dramatic approach – cheap popular theater:
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Dem Projekt fehlt die historische Distanz und Würdigung. Es wirkt
dramaturgisch veraltet und erinnert in negativem Sinne an Volkstheater. Ein
Beitrag wird einstimmig abgelehnt.67
However, the film made ends meet with funding made available by Swiss, Austrian, and
West German television stations. The finished product was screened in 1981.68 While the
Swiss media purported to be unmoved, especially the international press was very impressed
with the efforts of the Swiss filmmaker. While the Swiss newspaper Der Tages-Anzeiger
referred to the film as “definitely one of Markus Imhoof’s weaker films,” The New York
Times was full of praise for the production: “’The Boat is full’ is something more than a
discovery, something in the neighborhood of a revelation.”69 Das Boot ist voll received five
awards at the Berlin Film Festival in 1981.70 Was the ice of Switzerland’s frozen World War
II past finally broken?

4.2. Containing a Break in the Dam: The Bonjour Report
While artists and intellectuals had gradually been deconstructing postwar official Swiss
memory and helped construct a more diverse and unvarnished memory of World War II, the
government stubbornly still held on to its antiquarian politics of history and traditional
strategy of commissioning reports to control official public memory culture. In 1962, the
Swiss government commissioned the respected historian Edgar Bonjour to prepare a report
on Switzerland’s foreign policy during World War II. Once again external circumstances
triggered the commissioning of the Bonjour Report, like the White Paper of 1945, and the
Ludwig Report on refugees of 1957. The massive collection of Documents on German
Foreign Policy, published in 1961, and an article by the British journalist Jon Kimche
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portrayed Switzerland and the Swiss government in a completely new light than the Swiss
government had practiced for so long. These documents revealed Swiss political and
economic cooperation with Nazi Germany on many fronts. Under this external pressure, the
government agreed to let an established and deemed trustworthy historian access the Federal
documents.71 However, the Swiss government reserved the right to censor Bonjour’s
publications, and “’deleted at least one third of the original manuscript, in many cases highly
informative documents’ from his first documentary supplement, as he [Bonjour] himself
bitterly stated in his foreword [of the published report].”72 Only when the Swiss press and
Swiss historians heavily criticized the government did it agree to allow Bonjour to make
many of the censored documents public. However, once again the finished and tamed work
with the title The History of Swiss Neutrality ultimately failed to initiate an open debate on
neutrality. Georg Kreis explains:
Presentation of Swiss foreign relations was directed so much towards the
traditional understanding of neutrality that the new discoveries fit harmoniously
into the old pattern of knowledge. Whether the Federal Council which
commissioned the work strived for this consciously or unconsciously, all in all
the report supplied a confirmation of the old through the new.73
Swiss historian Jakob Tanner agreed with this perspective in an article for the NZZ Folio in
1991. Tanner argued that Bonjour painted in his History of Swiss Neutrality a picture of
“striking continuity” of the Swiss state system. He criticized that Bonjour’s fundamental faith
in this continuity was neither rational nor argumentative.74
The Bonjour Report ultimately failed to challenge the Swiss myth of neutrality during
the war, and promoted the initiation of a more unbiased discussion of Switzerland’s role and
identity. Yet the heating up of this debate was left to a new generation of historians.
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4.3. Deconstructing the Historical Myths: Critical Scholarly Research and A
New Generation of Historians
Unleashed by artists and intellectuals in the 1960s, a new generation of historians picked up
the discussion of Switzerland’s role during World War II in the 1970s and 80s. Younger
historians increasingly deconstructed the official historical memory of the war, and created a
widening gap between official memory myths and critical scholarly empirical research. 75 By
the end of the 1980s, Swiss historians had basically dismantled the main myths that made up
official Swiss historical and cultural memory of World War II.
The myth of Switzerland as the Good Samaritan was challenged by research on
Switzerland’s policy on refugees from Nazi Germany. Important studies on the subject were
produced already before the 1970s and 80s, such as the official Ludwig report on refugees of
1957. However, up until the 1970s the revelations dealing with Switzerland’s refugee
politics, mostly failed in provoking a real debate on the issue. 76 Although facts like the
rejection of over 20,000 Jewish refugees at the Swiss borders were available to the Swiss
public, it did not significantly register with the public and alter Switzerland’s self-perception
as a Good Samaritan. Only projects like the 1978 TV-miniseries Holocaust, or the film Das
Boot ist voll in 1981 created a more receptive climate for publications on Swiss refugee
politics, such as Hans-Ulrich Jost’s Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer or Jacques
Picard’s Die Schweiz und die Juden.77 These books no longer minced words: “Jost said of the
refugee policy that it had been ‘extremely restrictive’ in the 1930s, had been ‘tightened in an
inhumane manner’ after the outbreak of war and formed the darkest chapter of the country’s
history during the Second World War.”78 The combination of unvarnished creative
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representations and critical academic publications, coupled with the support of a broad echo
in the national media, created a more accurate image of Switzerland’s refugee politics during
World War II: “These recollective efforts even resulted, in 1992, in the minting of an official
commemorative coin bearing an uncompromising image of barbed wire and a portrait of the
wartime refugee activist Gertrud Kurz.”79
The myth of Switzerland as a relentlessly neutral country during the war was
unmasked by studies revealing the significance of the economic relationships between
Switzerland and the Third Reich. Works by Klaus Urner and Edgar Bonjour established how
external pressure forced Switzerland to abandon its neutral position. Towards the end of the
1980s, Werner Rings, Peter Utz and Hans Ulrich Jost discovered that Switzerland had
purchased enormous amounts of gold from Nazi Germany.80 In his work Bedrohung und
Enge,
Jost placed the centre of gravity in his discussion on the Swiss financial center’s
cooperation with Germany and gave a comprehensive analysis of the role of
‘Switzerland as a central entrepôt for movements of gold and foreign exchange’,
singling out the ‘morally disquieting’ acceptance of looted gold and the granting
of a clearing loan to Germany.”81
Revelations like these, based on careful archival work by scholars, shed an entirely new light
on Switzerland’s role during the war, and shifted the country’s image from an innocent
bystander to a greedy war profiteer. Switzerland made indeed some “Faustian bargains.”82
“This tended to play down the image of a Switzerland innocent because of its neutrality.”83
One of the most important documents that questioned the Swiss myth of neutrality
was Markus Heiniger’s work Dreizehn Gründe: Warum die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg
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nicht erobert wurde,84 published in 1989.85 By analyzing non-military, but economic aspects
of the question why Switzerland had been spared during the war, he undermined not only the
myth of Swiss neutrality, but also of the power of the Swiss army. He even went as far as to
say, that only a “systematic financial blockade and massive pressure by the Allies compelled
the Swiss authorities at the war’s end, to curb the hitherto almost boundless freedom enjoyed
by the banks.”86
As the brutally pragmatic economic pressures on and concessions made by
Switzerland to make it through the war became gradually known, the myth of the Swiss
réduit national, the alpine fortress in which the army defended Switzerland against the Third
Reich, also came under intense scrutiny. Already in 1970, the journalist Christoph Geiser had
mentioned that “Hitler didn’t have to occupy Switzerland, because Swiss industry worked for
him anyway.”87 Over the course of the 1980s this view became more and more confirmed by
scholars. Had Hitler decided to invade Switzerland, the Axis would have crushed the Swiss
army in its alpine fortress. Hans-Ulrich Jost mentioned in 1983 that the occupation of
Switzerland would have been costly, but by all means feasible without great difficulties.88
The dismantlement of the power of the Swiss army was accompanied and further reinforced
by an initiative of the radical left to abolish the army, namely to “slaughter the holy cow.”89
Although the initiative did not succeed in the end, it still significantly weakened the position
of the army as the unassailable “hedgehog” in the Alps as a principal lieux de mémoire of
Swiss national historical memory.90
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4.4. End of the Cold War: The Memory Crisis of 1989
Although the referendum on the abolishment of the army failed in the end, only 35% of the
voters had agreed to get rid of the army, a national symbol of the defense and protection of
the country. The government took this vote as a reflection on the population’s confidence in
its leadership. Yet all was not well: “For the government, the result was disastrous. It exposed
both the failure of official memory politics and a loss of confidence in the ruling four-party
coalition. The referendum’s coincidence with the fall of the Berlin Wall further deepened the
crisis.”91 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War made the crisis in
Switzerland even worse. In a time of crisis, Switzerland normally would have drawn strength
from its national historical myths to remind itself of its qualities and its identity as a strong,
well-fortified, benevolent, and neutral country. But by the end of the 1980s, a considerable
amount of critical research on Switzerland’s role during World War II had been done, and
most myths established in the post-war period had been dismantled by the intellectuals and
historians. Although these findings had been widely ignored by politicians and the general
public,92 they came to light when the government and the population needed them most. In a
time of sea changes in the world order, the country fundamentally lacked orientation and a
secure identity to fall back on – Switzerland no longer could rely on its dearly held World
War II myths to hold on to in times of adversity.
This widening discrepancy between academic research and official historical memory,
combined with both the domestic and international political situation, triggered a major
memory crisis in Switzerland in 1989. This initial confrontation with “unfinished business”
from World War II should have been a wake-up call for Switzerland, and an opportunity to
confront old memory dogmas and produce new collective memories by finally including the
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research of a younger generation of historians and thus tempering and modifying the old
historical myths.93 However, the crisis did not immediately initiate a paradigm shift. Once
more, enormous pressure emanating from the outside was needed to make the Swiss
government and the public at large adjust and alter their memory of World War II. Historian
Elazar Barkan has analyzed this new “guilt of nations” in the 1990s as “new international
moral frame” with an unprecedented “willingness of nations to embrace their own guilt.”94

5. The Collapse of the Official World War II
Mythology: The 1990s, the Commission of
Independent

Experts,

and

Mastering

Switzerland’s World War II Past
In the 1990s, almost 50 years after the end of World War II, history caught up with the Swiss
people. The memory crisis of 1989 had failed to produce a new and honest collective
accounting of the recent scholarly revisions clashing with the official historical memory. The
Swiss public and the national and international media were greatly surprised, when a
disgruntled Swiss bank clerk revealed to the world the existence of a large number of
dormant secret bank accounts, many of them belonging to the victims of the Holocaust.
American Jewish organizations filed a class-action lawsuit against Swiss banks, claiming
back countless unclaimed assets dating back to World War II and pressuring Swiss banks to
make public the identity of the holders of the the dormant bank accounts. Steps towards the
return of these unclaimed assets had been made as far back as 1946 through the Washington
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Accords and in 1962 through federal legislation, but they did not lead to satisfactory results:95
“Although attempts to revisit this issue have been made ever since, we must acknowledge the
frustration of Holocaust survivors and their heirs that this issue is still with us 50 years after
the end of the War … Many have legitimately questioned why it has taken nearly 50 years to
obtain a comprehensive and transparent accounting of this issue”,96 stated U.S. Under
Secretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat before the House Banking and Financial Services
Committee in Washington DC in 1996.97 The law suit ultimately resulted in a settlement
between the Swiss banks and the Jewish organizations in 1998.98 Swiss banks now paid the
prize for their lack of transparency when it came to Holocaust era assets parked in
Switzerland during World War II.
The question what had happened to these unclaimed Jewish assets after the war was
only the trigger for a much larger debate on Switzerland’s past. The claim for restitution by
the Jewish organizations brought about a large amount of research, conducted in American
and British archives.99 The question arose what Switzerland’s role during World War II
actually looked like. If Switzerland had profited from the war, and managed to evade
exposure on this matter, what else was hidden by the official collective memory established
by the Swiss government? The research uncovered a lot of Switzerland’s unfinished business
from World War II that had been deliberately silenced and suppressed by government and the
business leadership in the immediate post-war era.
In the 1990s, Switzerland was confronted with aspects of World War II the Swiss
government had tried to brush under the carpet since the end of the war: Switzerland’s

95

Ludi, 229-230.
The United States Department of State, Holocaust Assets,
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/961219eizen.html (accessed November 12, 2011).
97
See also his memoirs Stuart Eizenstadt, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished
Business of World War II (New York: Public Affairs, 2003).
98
Ludi, 323.
99
Ludi, 323.
96

43
collaboration with the Nazis, the purchase of Nazi gold by Swiss banks, Switzerland’s role as
a hub for stolen art,100 and its cooperation with secret intelligence services were made public,
as well as the refusal to admit Jewish refugees into the country: The monumental clash
between the official memory production and scholarly research findings finally came to the
fore:
The discrepancy could not have been bigger in the mid-1990s between its
officially endorsed image as the paragon of virtue—the cradle of the Red Cross
and humanitarian law—and charges that painted the country as a Holocaust
bystander ruthlessly profiteering from other people’s misery. In the eyes of
observers from abroad, the Swiss appeared totally oblivious of their wartime
past.101
The process was extensively covered by the international media, and carried out in the
spotlight of international attention. Switzerland had always cultivated its image as a
benevolent and humanitarian nation, and the international press had a field day writing about
this radical change of image:
For a few years at the end of the twentieth century Switzerland was the focal
point of a frenzy of activities, as diplomats, politicians, and lobbyists battled over
one of the last pieces of ‘unfinished business from the Second World War … The
inquest turned into a spectacle mediated by the global news media to a fascinated
public around the world.102
These international media attacks had serious repercussions for Switzerland. They damaged
the country’s moral identity and challenged the population’s understanding of its
government’s role in memory production and its own past. Scholarly research had been
painting a different picture of Switzerland’s past – a view of the complex past that had been
available since the 1980s – the large public and the government had failed to take note of the
new scholarly findings and refused to include them in their individual memories -- their
personal understanding of the past shaped by the comfortable Swiss collective memory.
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Therefore, the new image of the World War II past 1990 was a brutal wake-up call for the
Swiss nation and produced a deep identity crisis. The Good Samaritan myth, the myth of the
“hedgehog” Switzerland, and the myth of Switzerland’s neutrality all were unceremoniously
shattered. Jean-François Bergier described the climate in Switzerland as follows:
The shadow has become so dense, that the Swiss can no longer find their own
history within it, and have become disoriented. On this occasion the phenomenon
really is exceptional, and it is being reflected in an unprecedented crisis of the
Swiss conscience.103
In 1996, this “crisis of conscience” became so serious that the Swiss government issued an
urgent federal decree, calling for the creation of an independent commission of experts (ICE)
to “study, from a historical and legal standpoint, the fate of assets which found their way to
Switzerland after the national socialist regime came to power.”104 The Swiss government
once again fell back on a well-established device in its politics of history – to establish a
historian’s commission to produce a report that might clear the air. Given the international
attention given to Switzerland’s unseemly role in World War II, this time it had to be an
international historians’ commission.
In a sense, the establishment of the ICE was as surprising as it was expected. From
Näf’s White Paper in 1945, to Ludwig’s Report in 1957, to the Bonjour Report 1962, the
commissioning of reports had been the governments preferred method of dealing and
controlling historical memory for decades. Considering the fact, however, that government’s
repeated attempts to control and shape historical memory had caused the crisis of the 1990s
in the first place, it is surprising that the Swiss government chose the same strategy in its
politics of history to resolve the current crisis.
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Yet this commission was different. For one it was an international commission of
historians. The membership of the international commission read like a “Who’s Who” of
Holocaust era assets specialists and top experts on Nazi economic and financial policies:
Jean-François Bergier, Georg Kreis, Jacques Piccard, Jakob Tanner, Joseph Voyame,
Wladiyslaw Bartoszeski, Saul Friedländer, Harold James, Sybil Milton (later replaced by
Helen B. Junz), and Joseph Voyame (later replaced by Daniel Thürer). Although the
commission was called the Independent Commission of Experts, they were by no means
given unrestricted free reigns in their research. First, commission members were placed under
a duty of confidentiality and were not allowed to disclose any information gathered to any
third party or person – in particular not to other historians. Second, they were financially
dependent in their research endeavors on the Swiss government; they were also obligated to
submit regular reports on their progress. Bergier, a prominent Swiss economic historian and
the head of the ICE posed the question whether it was proper to allow only a limited amount
of researchers access to the sources: “Is this not an infringement of freedom of research? I
think not, provided that reasonable use is made of this unusual privilege, and that use
includes taking account of the general interest; exceptional situations call for exceptional
means.”105 The commission however, was unrestricted in establishing its own methods of
inquiry and its choice of members.
In 2002, the ICE at last issued its final report. The group of international Holocaust
era experts addressed in the massive 597-page report Switzerland’s role during World War II.
Individual chapters discussed Swiss refugee policy, foreign trade relations, asset transactions,
as well as law and legal practices in dealing with issues of property rights and restitution in
the post-war period.
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The results of the painful 2002 ICE report undoubtedly marked a paradigm shift in
Switzerland’s historical memory of World War II. In its final report, it came to the following
basic conclusions:
1. By sending thousands of Jewish refugees back to its borders, Switzerland willy nilly
contributed its share to the Nazi’s extermination campaign: “… by progressively
closing the borders, delivering captured refugees over to their persecutors, and
adhering to restrictive principles for far too long, the country stood by as many people
were undoubtedly driven into certain death. In this way Switzerland contributed to the
Nazi’s success in achieving their goals.”106
2. The Swiss government was not substantially involved in the gold transactions with
Nazi Germany: “The Federal Council did nothing to obtain any information about this
[the gold transaction with the Reichsbank], and left the fundamental political
decisions to the Swiss National Bank (SNB).”107 The Swiss government looked away
when it came to gold transactions with Nazi Germany.
3. It cannot be proven that Switzerland’s economic relations with Nazi Germany
prolonged the war: “The theory which maintains that the services, exports, and loans
provided by Switzerland influenced the course of the war to a significant degree could
not be substantiated. This has less to do with a general ‘insignificance’ of Swiss
exports and financial centre services than with the enormous economic dimensions of
this war and the multifarious factors which determined the war economy and the
unfolding of events on the front.”108
4. Switzerland and certain Swiss individuals did benefit financially from the war:
“Although the ICE was able to document specific cases, it was impossible to come to
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any quantitative conclusions. But it is beyond doubt that these transactions
substantially benefited the “middlemen”… As a neutral country which had been
spared the ravages of war, it certainly had a competitive advantage.”
5. Switzerland violated its neutrality by working together with the Axis powers during
World War II and admitted to have been ‘sitting on the fence’: “Switzerland did not
always strictly fulfil its duties under the neutrality law. Violations occurred in the
export and inadequate monitoring of the transit of war materials and also in the
granting of loans to Germany and Italy for use in the war economy. Switzerland often
hid behind its neutrality and this same neutrality was improperly invoked to justify
not only decisions made in all kinds of spheres, but also inaction on the part of the
State.”109
The crisis of the 1990s resulted in Switzerland paying billions of Swiss francs in
compensations to the victims of the Holocaust who had been affected by the Swiss
unwillingness of making public thousands of unclaimed assets parked in Switzerland’s
vaunted financial institutions during the war. This resulted in a dramatic paradigm shift
regarding the memory of the war. A whitewashed memory that had been cultivated and
safeguarded for almost five decades was replaced by a more complex and honest perspective
on the events of the war.
Although the government had accepted this new and more complex memory of the
war, the reactions of the Swiss population were, and still are, ambiguous: “The destruction of
dear beliefs, furthermore, alienated many citizens from the political establishment who has
largely endorsed the new interpretations. Widespread frustration eventually benefited the
national-conservative right, with the Schweizerische Volkspartei (People’s Party) becoming
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the strongest force on the federal level.”110 In response to the ICE, organizations like the
Arbeitskreis Gelebte Geschichte (research group living history) or the umbrella association
Interessengemeinschaft Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg (joint venture Switzerland – Second
World War) emerged, which made it their mission to “support people and publications, which
provide a certain balance to the trend of discrediting Switzerland and the wartime generation.
The joint venture resists the further demolishment of Switzerland’s reputation.”111 It is an
ongoing challenge for the Swiss people to integrate such a rich and manifold memory into
their public memory culture and create an edifying but still truthful identity that people
embrace and can live with. Switzerland, at last, is mastering its World War II past.

6. Conclusion
“Every nation and every country feeds on its myths. The function of the historian
is not to destroy the myths. The only effect of that is to reproduce the myth in
negative form, to create an anti-myth. In any case, the operation generally proves
futile. The fact is that myths have their own existence, and though the assaults of
historical logic may disturb that existence they cannot destroy it.”112
Over the second half of the 20h century, the Swiss government and a small group of key
government figures, such as Petitpierre, General Guisan, and Bonjour worked hard to
integrate Switzerland’s experience of World War II into a constructed and well-protected
national self-image. The historical memory of the war became a keystone in maintaining
Switzerland’s image as well-fortified, humanitarian, and neutral country in the heart of
Europe. Over the years, first artists and intellectuals and then also a younger generation of
historians attempted to paint a more realistic and truthful picture of Switzerland’s role during
the war. But it was not until the 1990s that the Swiss myths were seemingly shattered through
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external pressure after the revelation of the dormant accounts in Swiss banks of Holocaust era
victims. I agree with Jean-François Bergier when he says that the existence of historical
myths cannot be destroyed, although it seems like this happened during the 1990s. What first
and foremost suffered during the 1990s was Swiss national pride. Not unlike the Americans,
Swiss people are exceedingly proud of their country, its prosperity, natural beauty, and
relative isolation from the world. For decades, Swiss people were used to sit on their
“balcony over Europe,” cultivating their high living standards and being pleased with their
proud civic culture. With the recent deconstruction of their treasured national World War II
myths, and the revelation of parts of their history clashing with their self-image, Switzerland
seemed to lose some of its identity. What happened in 1996 split a whole nation into two
camps: the self-styled “patriots” adhered to the old myths, and the “progressives” (or in some
people’s view, the “traitors”) accepted the darker aspects of the Swiss past. Switzerland will
have to find a way how to live with the memory of their past and how to include it into their
national identity. The International Commission of Experts, called into existence by the Swiss
government in 1996, accused the country of having breached its neutrality and neglected its
humanitarian duty during the war. This rung in a necessary paradigm shift in the way the
collective national memory of the war was handled. The ICE’s critical findings of
Switzerland´s role during World War II will hopefully encourage more open discourses on
the country’s past in the future. The ICE report was a major step towards Switzerland at last
beginning to master its complex and ambiguous World War II past.
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